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A. Purpose of the Study 
The rapid surge in the costs of health care has become of pressing 
national concern. In 1965 the nation spend $38.9 billion in health care, 
amounting to 5.9 percent of the GNP. In 1977 total national health 
1 
expenditures reached $163 billion, or 8.8 percent of the GNP. While 
drugs are an indispensable component of the health care system as a whole, 
the costs of drugs have accounted for not only a relatively small but 
also a declining share of total health costs. As shown in Table I, drugs 
and drug sundries accounted for $12.6 billion, or 7.7 percent of total 
national health care expenditures in 1977, in comparison with 11. 9 percent 
in 1965. 
It is clear that drugs present a relatively inexpensive form of 
therapy. Drug therapy often provides an alternative to more expensive 
means of treatment such as surgery, hospital care, and radiology. The 
substitution of low-cost drug therapy for other more costly types of 
therapy can greatly reduce medical costs. In view of the rapidly rising 
costs of health care, the production of new and existing drugs may 
1Trends in "total national health expenditures" and in "drugs and 
drug sundries" are presented in Table I, p. 11. 
l 
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provide large benefits to consumers. Rates of output in the pharma-
ceutical industry, however, will in fact depend largely on conditions 
of entry. 
Theoretical work in the past 20 years by Sylos [59], Bain [ 3}, and 
Modigliani [38] has suggested that firms considering entry into an 
existing market may face a disadvantage relative to firms already 
established in that market. Despite the theoretical importance of entry 
conditions, however, little empirical research has been done on 1 the 
\ 
determinants of and effects of entry. 
The purpose of this study is to develop a theoretical model of entry 
conditions into the pharmaceutical industry, and using data for prescrip-
tion drug markets, to investigate empirically the determinants of the 
rate of entry and the effects of entry on market structure. An important 
' k-~'~ •'' ---, 
c~at~~:) of the study is an examination of the role of technological 
innovation in the entry process in therapeutic drug markets. In pre-
viously published papers, some economists have argued that research and 
development (R & D) activities in the pharmaceutical industry may tend 
to reduce competition [11]. The present study investigates whether 
R & D resulting in new drug introductions facilitates or impedes 
competition in drug markets. 
B. Methodology of the Study 
Much of the research for the present study is concerned with the 
development and quantification of a measure of the rate of entry and of 
various alternative market structure variables which seem likely to 
affect the rate of entry. The study employs proprietary data for 
thousands of prescription drug products sold in the United States during 
the period 1964-1974. A sample of 20 therapeutic drug markets is used 
in the study. In general, these markets are more well-defined--
according to economic substitutability criteria--than have been the 
samples of markets employed in most of the previous empirical studies 
of entry. 
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A number of empirical studies of entry have regressed the profit 
rate, rather than entry, on various structural characteristics considered 
to be entry barriers [12, 37]. As pointed out by Orr [43, p. 58] in his 
study, this specification is an indirect rather than a direct test of 
"the propensity of these factors to deter entrants." In addition, 
measurement errors in the profit rate may distort the true condition of 
entry [43, p. 58]. The present study regresses the rate of entry on 
variables designed to measure entry barriers and entry incentives. More 
specifically, the rate of entry into drug markets is expected to be 
determined by factors such as demand growth, technological innovation, 
product differentiation and seller concentration. Ordinary least squares 
techniques are employed in the study to estimate the parameters for 
various alternative versions of a model which is hypothesized to explain 
the rate of entry into drug markets. 
C. Organization of the Study 
The chapters of this study are organized as follows. Chapter II 
presents important background information about the economics of the 
pharmaceutical industry in the United States. Chapter III develops a 
theoretical model of entry along with a brief review of previous studies 
of entry. Chapter IV presents the hypotheses and the empirical results 
of the study; it also includes a description of data source, the sample, 
and variables used in the study. Chapter V provides a brief summary 
and conclusions for the study. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
The main objective of this chapter is to provide background informa-
tion for the theoretical and empirical analysis of the pharmaceutical 
industry presented later in the study. The chapter consists of four 
sections. The first section gives an overview of the pharmaceutical 
industry in the United States. The next two sections focus on the 
characteristics of demand for and supply of pharmaceutical drugs. The 
last section deals with major governmental policies concerning the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
A. Overview of the Industry 
1. Definition of the Industry 
The pharmaceutical drug industry is defined to include those firms 
that manufacture and distribute pharmaceutical preparations available to 
consumers only by medical prescription. Prescription drugs are potent 
chemotherapeutic agents, frequently with unwanted side effects, and 
require the supervision of a physician. Pharmacists dispense these 
products only to patients who present a physician's prescription. Thus, 
producers of prescription drugs promote their products primarily to the 
medical professions licensed by law to prescribe and dispense them. 
Consequently, the industry is often referred to as the ethical drug 
5 
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industry, as opposed to the proprietary drug industry whose products are 
safe for self-medication and promoted primarily to the general public 
f64, p. 4]. 
2. Drug Names 
Each drug may be identified by three names: (1) chemical name, 
(2) generic name, and (3) brand name. Most drugs are synthesized from 
chemical substances and have chemical names to describe the molecular 
structure of the principal ingredient(s). They are often complex. For 




A new drug is assigned a generic name which supposedly indicates 
the general pharmaceutical properties of its substance [57, p. 36]. The 
generic name of the above chemical substance is tetracycline hydrochloride. 
A firm may choose to market the drug under its generic name. However, 
a firm often assigns it a brand name, which is usually short, simple and 
easy to remember. Thus, generically similar drugs are frequently 
available under different brand names. Achromycin (Lederle), Panmycin 
(Upjohn), Robitet (Robins), and Sumycin (Squibb) are examples of branded 
tetracyclines [50J. 
3. 1 Development of the Industry 
The discovery of sulfa drugs in the 1930's and the commercial success 
1Materials presented here are primarily from Measday [36, pp. 250-
255]. 
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of penicillin during World War II have drastically changed the outlook 
of the ethical drug industry. Before World War II there were relatively 
few drugs available to the physician. Most of them were of natural 
substance. The ethical drug industry primarily supplied active drug 
ingredients in bulk form to the pharmacist, who then compounded them as 
prescribed by the physician into dosage forms for the patientts consump-
tion. Little effort was devoted to the research and development of new 
drugs. The promotional efforts of drug companies were minimal because a 
large proportion of their products were relatively standardized medicinal 
chemicals. 
The advent of sulfa drugs stimulat~d the research interest in drug 
therapy and eventually led to a revolution in chemotherapy. Leadership 
in pharmaceutical innovation shifted from Europe to the United States 
during World War II. Since then, most new drugs have been discovered in 
the U.S. World War II not only had a profound impact on the research 
and development of antibiotics and other drugs, it also changed other 
important aspects of the industry. Today almost all prescription drugs 
are provided in final dosage form, ready for administration to the patient. 
That is, the compounding function of the retail pharmacist is displaced 
by the mass production of drug manufacturers. Accordingly, the drug 
companies have since launched large promotional campaigns directed to the 
medical profession. As a result, product differentiation achieved through 
research and development of new drugs and accompanying intensive pro-
motion has become the vehicle of competition among the leading 
pharmaceutical firms. 
The persistently high profitability for the pharmaceutical industry 
has attracted a number of new firms since World War II. One route of 
8 
entry has been by firms that were originally chemical companies. Firms 
such as Merck and Pfizer started as major suppliers of drug products in 
finished form during World War II. A more recent example is the Dow 
Chemical Company moving into the pharmaceutical field. 
Another route of entry has been the expansion of proprietary manu-
facturers. American Home Products acquired Wyeth and Ayerst to enter the 
race in the ethical sector. Bristol Laboratories was established by 
Bristol-Myers. Norwich Pharmacal Company set up Eaton Laboratories. 
Hoffman-LaRoche, Ciba-Geigy and a host of others form another 
distinct group of entrants. They are subsidiaries of foreign pharma-
ceutical manufactuers. In 1977 there were 36 subsidiaries owned by 20 
foreign pharmaceutical manufacturers as opposed to 12 manufacturers 
owned abroad in 1963 [45, p. 73]. 
B. Demand for Prescription Drugs 
1. The Nature of Demand for Prescription Drugs 
A distinct characteristic of demand for prescription drugs can be 
summarized in the words of the late Senator Kefauver [30, p. 8], "The 
man who orders does not pay, the man who pays does not order." Unlike 
most consumer goods, the ultimate consumer of a prescription drug is not 
the same person making the decision as to the product choice and the 
amount to be consumed. The decision is made for the consumer by his 
physician due to the fact a medical prescription is required to purchase 
any prescription drug. In writing a prescription, the physician not 
only decides on the appropriate drug therapy for his patient, he also 
determines the quantity to be taken by his patient. In addition, the 
choice of firm manufacturing the drug is often specified on a 
9 
prescription. The physician may explicitly specify the manufacturer of 
the prescribed drug product or he may implicitly identify the 
manufacturer by the use of its brand name. Thus, the physician acts 
as the purchasing agent for the patient who is then responsible for 
paying all or part of the drug bills. 
2. Price Elasticity of Demand 
The price inelasticity of demand for prescription drugs is, in large 
part, the result of the unique relationship between the physician and the 
patient as mentioned above. The drug selection is made not by the 
patient but by the physician who is not spending his own money. Hence, 
physicians may not be as price conscious as patients. In addition, the 
physician may be concerned more with the appropriateness of drug therapy 
for his patient than with the costs involved [36, p. 258; 56, pp. 108-
109; 58, p. 133]. Moreover, most physicians do not have adequate knowl-
edge of price or price alternatives due to the lack of such information 
in drug advertisements [36, p. 258; 64, p. 31]. Therefore, the price of 
a drug may not be considered as an important factor in the physician's 
prescribing decision. 
Neither does the patient tend to consider the price as an important 
factor in his buying decision [36, p. 258; 58, p. 133]. Drugs may be 
concerned with life and health, patients will have prescriptions filled 
independently of price. In many cases, the patient is unlikely to buy 
larger quantities of a particular drug than those recommended by his 
physician, even if its price declines substantially. Thus, in general, 
price changes are expected to have insignificant effects on quantity 
taken. Estimates of price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs 
range from 0.07 to 0.15 (68), indicating the demand for prescription 
drugs is relatively inelastic with respect to price. 
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While the demand for prescription drugs as a whole is relatively 
inelastic, the demand for many individual drugs, particularly for 
different brands of the same drug may exhibit considerable elasticity. 
The existence of substitutability among different brands tends to make 
demand for multi-source drugs more elastic. In addition, substitution 
among alternative brands has been facilitated by the repeal of state 
anti-substitution laws. Many states have passed laws permitting the 
pharmacist to ·substitute a generic equivalent for the drug prescribed 
by the physician (15, p. 7]. Hence, with the aid of state substitution 
laws, demand for a multi-source drug may become relatively elastic, 
compared with demand for a single-source drug for which there are no 
good substitutes. 
3. Increases in Demand Over Time 
a. Measures of Demand Increases 
As shown in Table I, expenditures for "drugs and drug sundries" in 
the United States have grown spectacularly from $601 million in 1929 to 
$12.5 billion in 1977. It should be pointed out that these expenditures 
includes "only spending for outpatient drugs and appliances and exclude 
those provided to hospital inpatients, nursing home patients, and through 
physicians' offices" (17, p. 18]. It has been estimated that expendi-
tures for outpatient prescription drugs were $7 billion, and accounted 
for 56 percent of total spending for drugs and drug sundries in 1977 
[17, p. 4). Drugs administered in hospitals are included in the costs 
of hospital care. According to American Hospital Association Surveys, 
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TABLE I 
NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES, 1929-1977 
Total National 
'~ 
Drugs and ~·o': 
Health Ex2enditures Drug Sundries 
Percent of Total 
Percent National Health 
Year $ million of GNP $ million Expenditures 
Ending J~ne: 
1929 3,589 3.5 601 16.7 
1935 2,846 4.1 471 16.5 
1940 3,883 4.1 624 16.1 
1950 12 '027 4.5 1,642 13.7 
1955 17,330 4.5 2,282 13.2 
1960 25' 856 5.2 3,591 13.9 
1965 38,892 5.9 4,647 11. 9 
1966 42,109 5.8 5,032 11.9 
1967 47,897 6.2 5,480 10.4 
1968 53,765 6.5 5,865 10.9 
1969 60,617 6.7 6,482 10.7 
1970 69,201 7.2 7 ,114 10.3 
1971 77,162 7.6 7,626 9.9 
1972 86,687 7.8 8,233 9.5 
1973 95,383 7.7 8,942 9.5 
1974 106,321 7.8 9,695 9.3 
1975 132, 716 8.5 10' 357 8.4 
Ending September: 
1975~~ 127 '719 8.6 10,582 8.3 
1976* 145,102 8.7 11,472 7.9 
1977* 162,627 8.8 12,516 7.7 
* Sources: Robert M. Gibson and Charles R. Fisher, "National Health 
** 
Expenditures, Fiscal Year 1977," Social Security Bulletin, 
Vol. 41 (July, 1978), pp. 3-20. 
Nancy L. Worthington, "National Health Expenditures, 1929-
1974," Social Security Bulletin, Vol. 38 (February, 1975), 
pp. 1-20. 
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hospital expenditures for drugs amounted to less than 4 percent of total 
hospital costs (49, p. 66]. Thus, the nation spent approximately $10 
billion for drugs administered in and out of the hospital in 1977. 
Drug utilization measured in terms of number of prescriptions 
dispensed also increased rapidly since 1967. Table II shows the number 
and percentage distribution of prescriptions dispensed by type of vendor. 
In 1967, the total prescriptions dispensed in this nation were 1.6 
billion. By 1974, there were 2.7 billion prescriptions written and 
filled, an increase of 70 percent over the period of seven years. Total 
outpatient prescriptions rose steadily from 1.1 billion in 1967 to 1.8 
billion in 1974. Table II also indicates that prescriptions dispensed to 
ambulatory patients are the most important segment of prescription market, 
accounted for more than 65 percent of total prescriptions dispensed 
during 1967-1974. On the other hand, hospital inpatients' prescriptions 
showed a gradual increase in market share from 28.9 percent in 1967 to 
35.0 percent in 1974. 
b. Causes of Demand Increases 
These phenomenal growth trends in drug use have been influenced by 
several factors over the years. These factors include population growth, 
the development of new drugs, increase in income, and third party health 
care finance. 
(1) Population Growth. Total population in the United States grew 
steadily from 133 million in 1940 to 217 million in 1977 (67, p. 6). In 
general, the larger the number of people, the larger quantity of pharma-
ceuticals that are demanded. More importantly, changes in the composition 
13 
of the population are expected to exert even greater influence on drug 
utilization. The elderly tend to use drugs more frequently than other 
groups. Total population for the aged increased from 16.7 million in 
1960 to 23.5 million in 1977 [67, p. 8]. As the population grows older, 
an increasing share of drug expenditures is for the old. In 1977, about 
23 percent of total drug expenditures was spent by the elderly who 











NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PRESCRIPTIONS DISPENSED, 
BY TYPE OF VENDOR, 1967-1974 
Hospital In:eatient Outpatient 
Total Rx's Rx's Percent of Rx's Percent 
(million) (million) Total (million) Total 
1,593 461 28.9 1,132 71.0 
1,756 513 29.2 1,243 70.7 
1,878 568 30.2 1,310 69.7 
2,000 630 31.5 1,370 68.5 
2,142 699 32.6 1,443 67.3 
2,296 769 33.4 1,527 66.5 
2,446 853 34.9 1,593 65.3 
2,704 946 35.0 1,758 65.0 
Source: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social 
Security Administration, Office of Research and Statistics, 
PrescriEtion Drug Data Summary, 1974, p. 35. 
of 
(2) Development of New Drugs. Advances in medical technology have 
greatly helped scientists to discover and develop new and/or improved 
14 
drugs. As indicated in Table III, large numbers of new and improved 
drugs have been invented since World War II. The rate of drug use tends 
to increase as a result of the development of more effective drugs. 
There may be no drug yet available to treat some diseases. Some existing 
drugs may have important limitations, therapeutically or administratively, 
which tend to discourage patients from consuming them. New drugs may not 
be merely good substitutes for previously ex:i:-st:rrig drugs; they may 
eventually replace old drugs. In addition, new effective drugs may even 
replace other means of treatment such as surgery and radiology. Hence, 
demand for pharmaceuticals in general appears to depend largely on the 
number of effective drugs available. 
(3) Increases in Incomes. Per capita income has been steadily 
increasing over the past three decades. Rising per capita income tends 
to increase demand for prescription drugs. The number of unfilled 
prescriptions tends to decline as a result of growth in income. More 
importantly, increases in income has encouraged consumers to seek more 
medical advice from their doctors which in turn has led to more drugs 
prescribed. 
(4) Third Party Health Care Finance. Americans are provided more 
access to medical care through private health insurance programs and 
Medicaid and Medicare since 196 7. The expansion of third-party financing 
system has helped to remove financial barriers to medical care, 
especially for the elderly and the poor. Consumers have come to bear 
much less than the full costs of health services. In 1977, total third-
party payments accounted for 70 percent of the outlays for personal 






























NEW PRODUCT INTRODUCTIONS IN THE ETHICAL PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY, 1950-1974 
New Single Duplicate Compounded· New Dosage 
Chemicals Products Products Forms 
28 100 198 118 
35 74 212 120 
35 77 202 170 
48 79 226 97 
38 87 255 108 
31 90 282 96 
42 79 280 66 
51 88 261 96 
44 73 253 109 
63 49 203 104 
45 62 199 98 
39 32 189 106 
27 43 180 84 
16 34 149 52 
17 29 111 41 
23 18 71 22 
12 15 53 26 
25 25 32 14 
11 26 50 21 
9 22 31 12 
16 50 39 23 
14 40 29 30 
11 35 18 30 
19 37 18 17 
18 42 23 26 
717 1,306 3,564 1,686 
Paul de Haen, Ten Year New Pro.duct Survey~ 1950-1960, Non-
15 
ProErietar~ Name Index, Vol. VI (New York: Paul de Haen, Inc., 
1967); New Products Parade, 1973-1974 (New York: Paul de Haen, 
Inc., 1975). 
16 
percent in 1960 [19, p. 18]. The impact of these third-party payments 
is to increase the demand for medical services which leads to an increase 
in demand for pharmaceuticals. In addition, prescription drugs financed 
by third parties have represented a rising proportion of total prescrip-
tions. It is estimated that the ratio doubled in five years, from 11.9 
percent in 1969 to 23.7 percent in 1974 [49, p. 58]. 
C. Supply of Prescription Drugs 
The characteristics of pharmaceutical manufacturers is discussed in 
this section. · It should be noted that some of the data presented here 
include both prescription and non-prescription drugs. No attempt is made 
here to separate these two components since non-prescription drugs 
comprise a small proportion of the "pharmaceutical" industry. In 
addition, today the same pharmaceutical manufacturers often participate 
in production in both areas. 
1. Size and Distribution of Sales 
Table IV shows in current and constant dollars the growth in ethical 
pharmaceuticals in final dosage form for human use since 1955. Over the 
period of 20 years, the total sales in current dollars have grown almost 
318 percent from over $1.5 billion in 1955 to $6.1 billion in 1974, even 
though the wholesale prices for ethical pharmaceuticals remained 
relatively stable over these years. Prices of drugs in fact declines for 
the decade of the 60's as shown in Table IV. The growth in constant-
dollar sales was 311 percent between 1955 and 1974, which is equivalent 
to an average rate of growth of 7.7 percent. On the average, the industry 
grew more rapidly than GNP for those years with real GNP averaging 3.3 
percent growth per year [67, p. 439]. 
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TABLE IV 
THE GROWTH OF U.S. ETHICAL PHARMACEUTICAL SALES, 1955-1974 
Current Dollar Wholesale Constant-
Sales* Price Dollar 
Year ($ millions) Index** Sales 
1955 1,457 107. 7 1,353 
1956 1,676 107. 2 . 1,563 
1957 1,742 108.7 1,603 
1958 1,802 109.1 1,652 
1959 1, 850 108.8 1,700 
1960 1,905 108.4 1,757 
1961 1,954 105.2 1,857 
1962 2,199 102.2 2,152 
1963 2,317 101.2 2,290 
1964 2,479 100.8 2,459 
1965 2 '779 101.2 2,746 
1966 3,011 100. 8 2,987 
1967 3,226 100.0 3,227 
1968 3,655 99.1 3,688 
1969 4,008 100.1 4,004 
1970 4,322 101.0 4,279 
1971 4,667 102.9 4,535 
1972 5,018 102.4 4,900 
1973 5,507 102. 7 5,362 
1974 6,083 109. 3 5,565 
* Sources: PMA Annual Survey Report; Also reprinted in Medical Marketing 
and Media, March 197 8, p. 18. 
** 
John M. Firestone, Index of Manufacturer's Prices to 
Retailers for Ethical Pharmaceuticals, 1976. 
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A distribution of sales by therapeutic category is presented in 
Table V. In 1972, antibiotics and ataraxics (including major and minor 
tranquilizers) constituted the two largest classes, with shares of 13.2 
percent and 11.0 percent respectively. Hormonal drugs (including 
contraceptives) was in third place with 8.7 percent of total sales, 
followed by drugs for cardiovascular purposes with a share of 7.4 percent. 
Considerable increases in relative shares since 1957 were noted for 
antiathritics, ataraxics, cardiovascular, and diuretic drugs. There 
were decreases in relative shares of antibiotics, and antiinfectives. 
All therapeutic classes show growing trends in terms of dollar sales. 
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association estimated that there 
were about 750 manufacturers of prescription drugs in 1974. Approximately 
80 percent of these firms were small, with less than $50 million in 
annual sales [49, p. 37]. According to the Internal Revenue Service, 
almost two thirds of 1,139 "drug" manufacturers in 1971 were small, with 
less than $100,000 in assets. Only 24 had assets of $100 million or 
more [49, p. 40]. The U.S. Bureau of the Census compiles data on the 
concentration ratios for the largest 4, 8, and 20 firms in the "pharma-
ceutical preparations" industry (SIC 2834). These concentration data 
are presented in Table VI. The overall industry concentration ratios 
have reamined remarkably stable between 1947 and 1972. The 4 largest 
firms account for about 25 percent, the largest 8 firms for about 45 
percent, and the largest 20 firms· for about 75 percent of total shipments. 
Thus, the remaining 25 percent of the industry's shipments accounted for 
by a large number of small firms. The market share held by the leading 
firms has in fact declined from 12.7 percent in 1951 to 7.6 percent in 
1974 [49, p. 38]. 
TABLE V 
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* * Antibacterials and antimalarials. Excludes antibiotics and sulfonamides. 
Also includes digitalis preparations and vasopressors. 
*:::Includes antacids, antidiarrheals, antinauseants, antispasm, and laxatives. 










































Source: IMS America, Ltd., U. S. Pharmaceutical Market, Drug Stores and Hospitals, various years. 
Reprinted in David Schwartzman, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, Baltimore: 




PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS INDUSTRY (SIC 2834), 
CONCENTRATION RATIOS, 1947-1972 
Percentage Accounted for by the 
20 
Largest 
Year 4 Firms 8 Firms 20 Firms 
1947 28 44 64 
1954 25 Lf4 68 
1958 27 45 73 
1963 22 38 72 
1967 24 40 73 
1970 26 43 NA 
1972 26 44 75 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of 
Manufacturers, 1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1975). 
While the entire industry exhibits relatively moderate concentra-
tion ratios, concentration in specific therapeutic categories is 
considerably higher. Table VII presents average concentration ratios in 
17 therapeutically important categories for the period 1956-1965. The 
top four products had market share of 50 percent or higher in 15 classes. 
The top eight products had more than two-thirds of the market in all 17 
classes. 
Table VIII presents the 4-firm concentration ratios measured in 
terms of number of prescriptions written and filled in 1964 and 1974 for 
20 relevant markets. As shown in Table VIII, there is considerable 
concentration in each therapeutic market. Some markets registered a 
moderate gain in concentration while others have shown a substantial 
decline in concentration over the period 1964-1974. 
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TABLE VII 












Diabetic therapy, other* 
Diuretics** 
Hormones, corticoids 
Corticoids with antiinfectives 




* Co:vers the pe.rio.d 1957-1965. 
~*Covers the period 1959-1965. 
Average Percent 
Share of Market 










































Source: Arthur D. Little, Inc., "Trends in Market Shares for Ethical 
Pharmaceutical Products," reprinted in U.S. Senate Select 
Committee on Small Business, Subcommittee on Monopoly, 
Hearings on Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry, Part 5, 
90th Congress, 1st Session (1968), pp. 1,788-1,805. 
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TABLE VIII 
4-FIRM CONCENTRATION RATIO BY PRESCRIPTION VOLUME, 20 RELEVANT MARKETS 
Index of Firms Market Share of Market Share of 
Turnover Top 4 Firms · Top Zf Firms 
1964-1974** in 1964 in. 1974 
Market* (%) (%) (%) 
1 25 58 34 
2 25 66 66 
3 50 53 69 
4 25 66 62 
5 0 58 55 
6 25 87 94 
7 0 48 42 
8 25 70 62 
9 25 87 77 
10 0 77 85 
11 25 61 55 
12 50 43 53 
13 50 71 70 
14 50 45 42 
15 50 39 39 
16 25 98 87 
17 25 60 64 
18 75 69 69 
19 25 98 69 
20 25 72 78 
* The numbers in this column refer to the listing of relevant 
markets presented in Table XIV (p. 61). 
** Number of firms appearing among the 4 largest in each therapeutic 
market in 1964 that did not appear among the 4 largest in 1974, 
expressed as a percentage. 
Source: IMS America, Ltd., National Prescription Audits, 1964-1974. 
Ratios were compiled by the author. 
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Although the commonly used measure of the degree of monopoly power 
is the concentration ratio, and as indicated above, the levels of 4-firm 
concentration ratios within the therapeutic markets run relatively high, 
they provide no information on the turnover of leading firms. In the 
20 relevant markets, the identity of the top 4 firms remained the same in 
only 3 markets. In 6 of the 20 at least 2 of the largest 4 firms in 1964 
had been displaced by other firms by 1974. Markham [35, pp. 169-170], 
Comanor [11, pp. 376-377], and Schwartzman [56, pp. 127-128] attribute 
this phenomenon of instability of leadership within therapeutic markets 
to innovative competition in the form of new product development and to 
a rapid rate of product obsolescence in the pharmaceutical industry. 
2. Cost Structure 
Developments since World War II have correspondingly changed the 
cost structure of the pharmaceutical industry. Variable costs on 
materials, labor, supplies, containers, and other necessary items involved 
in the production process of finished drugs account for a relatively low 
portion of total costs. As shown in Table IX, variable costs amounted 
to only 43 percent of total costs for 22 large pharmaceutical firms in 
1958. More than half of total costs were expenditures on drug research 
and development, sales promotion, and general administration. In addi-
tion to relatively low variable costs, the economies of size in the 
production process tend to be of negligible importance [58, pp. 134-135; 
64, pp. 36-37]. The most important economy of size seems to be in 
research for and development of new drugs and sales promotion. Another 
important characteristic concerns the relatively high mobility of 
resources employed within the areas of manufacturing, R & D, and 
marketing [9, pp. 235-238). The degree of resource flexibility may be 
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manifested in the number of therapeutic categories in which an individual 
firm has products for sale. On the basis of the leading 21 drug firms, 
Cocks [9, p. 236] concludes that "the average firm has products for sale 
in approximately 60 percent of the available therapeutic categories" 
in years of 1962 and 1972, indicating a high degree of manufacturing, 
R & D and marketing resource mobility possible within these firms. 
TABLE IX 
COSTS DISTRIBUTION FOR 22 LEADING DRUG COMPANIES, 1958 
Costs* 
Cost of Goods 
Research and Development Expenditures 
General and Administrative Expenditures 
















*S~les and expenditures relating.to drug operations only. 
Source: United States· Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 
Report of the Study on Administered Prices in the Drug 
Industry, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 1961, p. 31. 
In an attempt to differentiate their products from rivals', drug 
manufacturers have spent large sums on research and development and sales 
promotion. The following section deals with the nature and the costs 
of product differentiation activities pursued by drug manufacturers. 
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3. Product Differentiation 
Since World War II, product differentiation has become a far more 
important means of competition than the prices of drugs in the pharma-
ceutical industry [11, p. 373; 55, p. 897; 58, p. 148]. Research and 
development activities and sales promotion activities are the major 
strategies pursued by a drug manufacturer for differentiating its 
products from rivals either physically or conceptually. The efforts 
directed at new drug research and development are mainly conducted by 
larger drug firms. The product differentiation efforts of smaller drug 
firms tend to be limited largely to sales promotion. 
Extensive product differentiation may have the important effect of 
preventing the entry of firms into therapeutic markets in which profits 
are made [11, p. 373; 55, p. 899]. On the other hand, product differen-
tiation in the form of breakthrough products may provide an effective 
weapon to new firms of all sizes for surmounting barriers to entry into 
a drug field from which they would otherwise be foreclosed [54, p. 230]. 
a. Research and Development 
The health and welfare of human beings have been significantly 
enhanced by a flow of new drug products and processes as a result of 
firms' efforts to differentiate their products through R & D activities 
[56, 57]. Meanwhile, the market position and the profitability of 
individual drug firms depend to a large extent on the results of their 
research efforts. Many wonder drugs introduced in the past have 
significantly improved the market position and the financial health of 
the innovating firms. The important relationship of innovative efforts 
to financial success was soon recognized and the innovative strategy 
26 
which calls for investment in R & D has been the prevailing competitive 
strategy of large pharmaceutical manufacturers since World War II [11, 
36' 5 7]. 
(1) Motivations. Drug firms recognize that the way to achieve the 
greatest financial success is through significant breakthroughs in drug 
therapy. Successful drugs introduced in the 1950's and 1960's made 
investment in pharmaceutical R & D very attractive. Drugs with outstand-
ing therapeutic value such as Valium, Keflin, Indocin, and Aldomet 
continue to generate large sales and make a significant contribution to 
the innovating firm's profits. In 1975, Indocin and Aldomet accounted for 
more than 25 percent of Merck's $1.5 billion in sales and for more than 
40 percent of its $229 million in profits [51, p. 135]. It is this profit 
incentive that stimulates drug firms to engage in pharmaceutical research. 
The incentive to innovate is further strengthened by the current 
patent system. Patents create a barrier to entry by making it difficult 
for other firms to imitate the patented drug product. The original 
innovator is more likely to recoup what it has invested in R & D than is 
possible without patent protection. 
(2) New Product Introduction. The pharmaceutical industry's 
research effort is primarily devoted to the search for and development of 
new and improved drugs. As a result, a number of new drug products are 
introduced into the U.S. market each year. Table III (p. 15) lists the 
annual number of new drug products available in the U.S. during the 
period of 1950-1974. 
Types of new products in the pharmaceutical industry include new 
chemical entities (NCE's), duplicates, new combination products, and new 
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dosage forms [44). New chemical entities represent the most innovative 
output of pharmaceutical research since they are uni.que compounds not 
previously known and frequently represent significant new therapeutic 
advances. More than half of the total NCE's were introduced during the 
1950's, the golden era of drug therapy. In 1959, the largest number (63) 
of new single chemicals ever recorded in one year were introduced. Since 
then, the number has been declining. 
Duplicates of previously marketed chemical entities are usually 
manufactured by new rirrns and marketed under new brand names. New 
combinations of drugs are products having more than one active (pre-
viously introduced) ingredient. Table III reveals a sharp decline in 
the number of combination products over the time period. New dosage 
forms for drugs are developed in attempts to ease drug administration and 
to improve patient's compliance in drug therapy. For instance, if a 
product has originally been marketed in ampules, new dosage forms might 
include tablets, capsules, suppositories, etc. 
(3) R & D Expenditures. Table X lists total R & D expenditures for 
human pharmaceuticals spend by the U.S. pharmaceutical industry from 1951-
1974. Total R & D expenditures have substnatially increased from $50 
1tvv· 
million in 1951 to $859 million in 1974, an average rate of 13 percent 
of growth per year. 
Unlike other industries, government funds play a minor role in 
financing pharmaceutical R & D. The largest portion of R & D projects 
conducted by drug manufacturers is financed through their own internal 
funds. In 1974, the Federal Government provided $8.6 million to the 
pharmaceutical industry in R & D contracts, representing less than 1 
percent of total R & D expenditures for pharmaceuticals [49, p. 3]. 
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This is in sharp contrast to an average rate of 37 percent for all 
industry as a whole (40, p. 2). 
TABLE X 
R & D EXPENDITURES FOR HUMAN ETHICAL DRUGS 
Global Domestic Domestic 
R & D R & D Sales R & D/ 
Expenc11tures Expenditures Human Ethicals Sales 
Year ($ million) ($ million) ($ million) Ratio 







1965 328 $30l~ $2,940 10.3% 
1966 374 344 3,178 10. 8 
1967 412 378 3,393 11.1 
1968 472 410 3,808 10. 8 
1969 506 464 4,135 11.2 
1970 566 519 4,444 11. 7 
1971 629 577 4,796 12.0 
1972 667 601 5,136 11. 7 
1973 753 644 5,644 11.4 
1974 859 726 6,273 11.6 
Source: Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Annual Survey Report, 
various issues; domestic R & D expenditures and sales also 
appear in Grabowski (22, p. 43]. 
The pharmaceutical industry's strong commitment to research is 
reflected in its relatively high ratio of R & D to sales. Pharmaceutical 
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R & D expenditures in the U.S. have remained around 11-12 percent of 
domestic sales during 1965-1974, and reached a peak of 12.0 percent in 
1971 (see Table X). These relatively stable ratios indicate that R & D 
outlays for pharmaceutical research have kept pace with pharmaceutical 
sales volume. 
According to a PMA survey, more R & D funds are allocated to the 
search for drugs to treat central nervous system diseases, infections, 
neoplasms, and cardiovascular disorders. These four categories have 
accounted for approximately two-thirds of applied R & D expenditures 
over the 1965-1974 period. 
The industry R & D allocation data presented in Table XI shows a 
rather stable pattern of R & D funds allocation among therapeutic 
classes. Caglorcan, Faust and Schnee [6] further examine the pattern of 
allocation among drug manufacturers. They conclude that larger firms 
tend to have more stable patterns of R & D funds allocation than smaller 
firms [6, pp. 340-343]. 
b. Sales Promotion 
As a result of the proliferation of drug products, sales promotion 
becomes an important tool to a firm to penetrate a market initially and 
to maintain its market position later on. Therefore, research efforts 
are frequently accompanied by sales promotion efforts in order to 
achieve effective product differentiation (11, 36, 56, 57]. That is why 
drug companies with intensive R & D efforts tend to incur large sums of 
promotional expenditures. 
(1) Promotional Intensity. The pharmaceutical industry is 
characterized as one of high promotional intensity as reflected in its 
TABLE XI 
ALLOCATION OF R & D EXPENDITURES BY THERAPEUTIC CLASSES 
Percentage of Total U.S. R & D Funds * 
Therapeutic Class 1965 1966 1967 1968 1971 1972 
Central Nervous System 20.3 17.6 17. 8. 16.9 17.0 19.9 
Parasitic and Infective 
Diseases 18.6 20.0 20.0 20.7 21.5 18.1 
Neoplasms, Endocrine 
System, and Metabolic 
Diseases 18.0 17 .9 19.5 17.4 16.6 17.1 
Cardiovascular System 10.4 11.0 11.0 11. 7 12.2 13.6 
Digestive and Genitourinary 
Systems 8.3 7.6 6.7 6.1 7.1 6.0 
Biologicals 4.6 4.8 7.8 5.5 5.0 5.6 
Respiratory System 3.0 3.7 3.2 3.4 3.7 4.1 
Dermatologicals 1. 8 2.0 2.6 4.5 2.1 3.6 
Diagnostics 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.0 4.1 2.9 
Vitamins 2.6 2.6 2.1 1.9 3.0 2.4 
Other 10.1 10.5 7.1 9.9 7.7 6.7 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* Data for 1969 and 1970 not available. 
** Omitted in the 1974 survey. 






























ratio of promotional expenditures to sales. The esti~ates of promotion/ 
sales ratios for the pharm~ceutical industry vary. Most authors estimate 
that between 20 to 30 percent of the sales dollar is accounted for by 
drug promotion activities. Bond and Lean [5, p. l] estimated that in 
1970 the 30 largest drug manufacturers spent $682 million on promotion, 
or 21 percent of their sales dollar. A 25 percent of sales figure for 
drug promotion appeared in Congressional Hearings in 1961 [69, p. 157]. 
In comparison to other industries, the drug industry spends 
relatively more on advertising than most other industries [7, p. 60]. 
Based on Comanor and Wilson's [12, p. 439] estimates for 41 consumer 
goods industries during 1954-1957, the pharmaceutical industry was placed 
third after perfumes and cereals. 
It is clear that the pharmaceutical industry has allocated a 
considerably larger proportion of its sales revenues to promotion 
activities than to research and development. For the industry as a 
whole, the promotion expenditures appear to be at least twice as large 
as R & D expenditures. 
(2) Promotion Activities. A pharmaceutical firm engages in exten-
sive promotional activities to differentiate its products from others 
[11, 36, 56, 57]. The promotional efforts of drug firms are directed 
not toward the consumer but primarily toward the medical profession 
which makes drug selections for the consumer. In general, promotional 
media employed by drug firms include detailing, journal advertising, 
direct mails [28, 36, 56, 57]. The pharmaceutical industry uses sub-
stantial numbers of sales representatives to call on physicians and 
pharmacists in person. Data compiled by IMS indicate that more than 
two-third of total promotional expenditures were accounted for by 
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detailing during 1972-1978 [28]. Detailmen inform doctors and pharma-
cists of the availability, the effects and the appropriate use of the 
company's new products. They also remind doctors and pharmacists of the 
company's older drugs. They persuade the doctors to prescribe a company's 
products by stressing both brand names and company name, in hopes that 
sales will be expanded and that brand loyalties for the company's products 
will provide insulation from competition. 
Advertising in professional and trade journals is the second most 
important element in the promotion budget. It is estimated that 
approximately 23 percent of promotional expenditures were spend on 
journal advertising [28]. 
Direct-mail promotion accounts for less than 10 percent of total 
promotion spending [28]. The doctor receives thousands of promotional 
pieces a year. Drug promotion activities also include drug samples 
distributed free to physicians, the support of scientific or medical 
conferences or symposia and exhibits at medical conventions. 
4. PYice Competition 
Non-price competition as discussed above tends to overshadow price 
competition in the pharmaceutical industry. During the Kefauver 
hearings, it was charged that manufacturers of pharmaceuticals frequently 
were able to 11 admil1ister" prices of their drug products and refrain from 
price competition [70]. Since the Kefauver hearings, however, the 
conditions of competition in the pharmaceutical industry have markedly 




The evidence of price inflexibility in antibiotics and corticoster-
oid hormones was presented during the Kefauver hearings. In another 
study Markham [35] observed prices for 308 individual products for the 
10-year period 1949-1959. He concluded that more than 50 percent of 
products observed did not change price at· all during the 10-year period 
.[p. 170]. 
More recent studies of drug prices provide the evidence that there 
has been a great deal of price competition in the pharmaceutical industry 
[10, pp. 349-362; 56, pp. 251-299]. Cocks and Virts [10] analyzed the 
price movement of 107 leading products in 10 therapeutic classes. In 
Table XII, the price trends of leading products in 10 therapeutic 
products sets are shown. Through 1967, prices in each of the 10 product 
sets had declined from their 1962 levels. Despite general inflation in 
the U.S. since 1966, only 2 of 10.product sets exhibited upward price 
trends, being above the 1962 levels by 5 percent and 8 percent 
respectively. In 5 product sets, prices declined between 1962 and 1971. 
Substnatial price decline is noticed in the antiinfectives, oral 
\!'-" 
contraceptives, and diabetic therapy, by 32, 23, and 19 percent 
respectively. 
Schwartzman [56] confined his price study to multiple source 
products. He observed that "during the 1960's and early 1970's, 
manufacturers of large-selling multiple-source drugs engaged in severe 
price competition, especially in antibiotics" [p. 252]. Manufacturers 
of multiple source products were, evidently, seeking a sales edge through 
price cutting. In antibiotic markets, Schwartzman has observed that 
firms with smaller market shares were aggressive price cutters while 
firms with larger market shares tended to delay their price cuts. 
TABLE XII 
PRICE INDEXES IN THE DRUG INDUSTRY, TEN ETHICAL DRUG PRODUCT SETS, 1962-1971 
Product Set 1962 
1. Vitamin and hematinic 100 
2. Antiinfective 100 
3. Cough and cold 100 
4. Analgesic and 
antiinflammatory 100 
5. Antihypertensive and 
diuretic 100 
6. Psychopharmaceutical 100 
7. Antiobesity 100 
8. Oral contraceptive 100 
9. Anticholinergic and 
antispasmodic 100 
10. Diabetic therapy* 100 
BLS consumer price index 














































































































In the diabetic set the pricing data for the products of the company with whom the authors are 
associated was not complete. These numbers were directly obtained from the company. 
Source: Douglas L. Cocks and John R. Virts, "Pricing Behavior of the Ethical Pharmaceutical 
Industry," Journal of Business, Vol. 47 (July, 1974), pp. 355-358. 
w 
+:-
In the face of shrinking market shares, larger firms may be forced to 
cut their prices eventually [p. 298]. 
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Schwartzman [56, pp. 255-271] considered a number of factors that 
facilitate price competition. One is the ease of entry into the produc-
tion of duplicates. The costs of entry are within the reach of even small 
firms. The excess of average costs over marginal cost also permits firms 
which enter into a market late to undercut prices. In addition, public 
policies have moved in the direction of encouraging price competition in 
the industry [p. 299]. The repeal of anti-substitution laws and the 
Maximum Allowable Cost (MAC) program are· examples. 
5. Profitability 
The pharmaceutical industry has long been known for its persistently 
high rate of return on investment. Table XIII shows the average rate of 
return on net worth for the pharmaceutical industry and for all manufac-
turing during the period of 1958-1975. The average rate of return in the 
pharmaceutical industry was 1.63 times the average rate of return for 
all manufacturing. 
The rates of return on net worth as shown in Table XIII represent 
accounting rates of return. Expenditures on R & D and sales promotion 
are treated as- a current expense rather than an asset. Thus, the 
accounting rates of return may tend to overstate the true economic rate 
of return for those industries with a high rate of intangible investment 
in R & D and/or sales promotion. Clarkson [7] and Grabowski and Mueller 
[23] have made attempts to correct the accounting rates of return for 
the pharmaceutical industry by capitalizing the intangible investments in 
R & D and sales promotion. Both studies reached essentially similar 
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conclusions that the expensing of R & D and sales promotion overstate 
the rate of return on net worth in the pharmaceutical industry by 3-5 
percent [7, p. 64; 23, p. 332]. Even after appropriate adjustments of 
assets were made, the pharmaceutical industry was still a relatively 
profitable industry. 
TABLE XIII 





















INDUSTRY AND ALL MANUFACTURING, 1958-1975 










18.7 11. 7 
18.3 12.1 
18.4 11.5 
17 .6 9.3 
17 .9 9.7 
18.6 10.6 
19.0 12.8 
18.8 ll~. 9 
17.8 11.6 
Net Profit as a percent of the average of net worth at the 
beginning and end of each year. 
Source: FTC, Rates of Return for Identical Companies in Selected 
Manufacturing Industries (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, annual). 
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D. Public Policy 
The structural behavior and performance of the pharmaceutical 
industry have been increasingly influenced by a number of governmental 
policies. Two major policies concerning the pharmaceutical industry 
will be presented in this section. They are policies with regard to 
patents and new drug approvals. The emphasis will be primarily on 
changes in policies and their impacts on pharmaceutical innovation. 
1. Patents 
In order to protect the results of their research and development 
efforts, drug manufacturers increasingly seek protection primarily in 
the form of product patents. In the U.S., patents on pharmaceuticals 
may be granted for new products as well as for new processes. Process 
patents are numerically less important than product patents in the U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry. It was estimated that in 1961 nearly 80 percent 
of patents relating to medicine were used for new drug products rather 
than for new processes [11, p. 379]. In addition, patents on manufac-
turing processes tend to offer weaker protection to the inventor than 
patents on new drugs because a product like drugs may be synthesized by 
alternative processes. 
The following data reveal the important role that patent rights play 
in the pharmaceutical industry. A large share of prescription drugs are 
single-source drugs under patent protection. 
Walker [6Lf, p. 48] estimated that approximately 54 percent of the 
pharmaceutical industry sales in 1961 were accounted for by patented 
drugs which were available from a single supplier. In 1972, drugs which 
were protected by patents accounted for 65 percent of total drug sales 
[56, p. 107]. This implies that approximately 56 percent of total 
prescriptions were filled with patented drugs [56, p. 108]. In 1974, 
the 200 most frequently prescribed drugs accounted for more than two-
thirds of private prescription costs. Of these 200 leading drugs, at 
least 90 percent were still under patent protection and were produced 
by only one firm [36, p. 264]. In addition, many less frequently 
prescribed drugs are also patented. 
38 
It is interesting to note that the definition of a patentable 
product has been broadened since 1946. No product patent was available 
for penicillin on the ground that it was obtained from naturally 
occurring molds. Neither cortisone nor hydrocortisone was granted a 
product patent. In 1946, however, a patent was obtained on the new 
antibiotic streptomycin and in 1955 a patent was issued on another 
antibiotic tetracycline despite the fact that both were natural products 
[58, p. 136]. The broadening of the definition of patentability has 
profoundly affected the pharmaceutical industry's research interest in 
such areas as antibiotics, hormones and the like. In June 1980 the 
Supreme Court ruled that new forms of life created in the laboratory 
could be patented [62]. This decision is expected to influence the 
direction of pharmaceutical research. Already it is technically possible 
to produce on a large scale human insulin and human interferon, the 
antiviral substance that is being tested against cancer. In the future, 
pharmaceutical researchers should be able to develop new drug therapies 
to meet other medical needs through the new technology of gene trans-
plantation. 
Due to the nature of drug products which are chemically synthesized, 
the patent system plays a dual role in the pharmaceutical industry. Drug 
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patents are employed to limit competition by impeding imitations. On 
the other hand, drug patents encourage competition in the form of product 
variations by allowing other firms to "invent around" the patented drug. 
A drug product is relatively easy to imitate. With patent protec-
tion, the inventor of the drug can be insulated from outside competition 
and obtain monopoly power in that market. Therefore, patents are 
frequently considered as an entry barrier. By restricting competition, 
a patent can prevent. the innovator's return to R & D from being eroded 
by competition and, hence, provides drug manufacturers with incentives 
to invest even· in difficult research. Walker [64, pp. 49-50] has demon-
strated that patents indeed corifer some monopoly power and that entry 
into a drug market has been limited by patent protection. 
However, patent rights do not prevent other firms from "inventing 
around" the original patent [4, pp. 185-186]. The product patent of a 
drug reveals the molecular structure of the drug. This helps other 
scientists search for a useful product by manipulating the molecule of 
the existing product. Marck's success with chlorothiazide (Diuril), ..,...,__ 
which was introduced in late 1957, has encouraged other firms to enter 
the diuretics market. At least nine thiazide diuretics have been patented 
and marketed in the U.S. [4, p. 186]. Most molecular manipulations have 
resulted in new drugs with therapeutic value similar to the original drug. 
Yet they may be different enough to obtain a patent. Sometimes, molecular 
manipulations have yielded breakthrough products which possess other 
attributes different from the existing drugs. In spite of its success 
with Diuril, Merck could not rest on its laurels. A threat of drug 
obsolescence and diminishing monopoly position forced Merck to engage 
in further research. In 1959 Merck introduced hyprochlorothiazide 
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(HydroDiuril), which is a derivative of Diuril and yet is a breakthrough 
drug to treat hypertension [4, p. 186]. 
Thus, the patent can encourage competition on the basis of product 
variations. As a result, monopoly power of the original innovating firm 
may be eroded even during the life of the patent. In short, while entry 
barriers may be created by patents, these can be surmounted in the drug 
field, and, in fact, the opportunity to patent provides strong incentives 
to engage in research and development for newer drugs. 
2. New Drug Approval 
In an attempt to protect consumers' health, the federal government 
has imposed increasingly strict regulations on the development and 
marketing of drugs. In 1938, the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act was enacted 
in response to the tradegy caused by unsafe sulfanilamide [28, p. 6]. 
Before marketing any new drug, drug manufacturers were required by the 
1938 law to submit a New Drug Application (NDA) and prove to the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) that the drug was "safe" for the use suggested 
on the label. Under this law, the FDA was required to reject an NDA 
within a period of 180 days or the new drug was automatically approved 
for marketing [48, p. 6]. 
The most sweeping changes that took place in FDA regulation came 
with the 1962 amendments to the 1938 law. Revelations that the tran-
quilizer thalidomide had caused thousands of deformed babies was the 
main force in getting Congress to pass the 1962 amendments [48, p. 8]. 
With regard to premarket approval, a proof-of-efficacy requirement was 
added to the proof-of-safety requirement of the 1938 law [48, p. 9]. No 
new drug may now be marketed unless and until the FDA determines that 
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there is substantial evidence of safety and effectiveness in its intended 
use. 
The FDA was also given discretionary power over premarket testing 
procedures [48, p. 9]. Prior to filing an NDA the drug manufacturer 
must now submit to the FDA a plan of investigations of the new drug (IND) 
for clinical testing along with information from pre-clinical toxicity 
testing. The FDA may, at any point, terminate or modify clinical investi-
gations on the basis of its evaluation of the IND and subsequent progress 
reports of clinical research. In addition, the 1962 amendments remove 
the time constraint on FDA action on NDA's. 
Several studies were conducted to assess the impacts of the 1962 
amendments on the pharmaceutical industry [2, 47, 56]. Despite their 
methodological differences, many authors reached the same conclusion that 
the more stringent regulations for drug safety and efficacy has had a 
significant adverse side effect on pharmaceutical innovation. First, it 
now costs considerably more to develop a new drug than it did before 
1962. Schwartzman [56, pp. 69-70] estimated that the R & D cost of a 
new chemical entity was $1.3 million in 1960 and the corresponding 
estimate for 1973 was $24.4 million. Studies by Baily [2, p. 78] and 
by Peltzman [47, p. 1097] also provide estimates of the effect of the 
1962 amendments on R & D costs. Baily estimated that the 1962 amendments 
have increased the cost of an NCE by 131 percent, while Peltzman 
estimated that they have doubled the constant-dollar cost of an NCE. 
Second, the 1962 amendments have lengthened the gestation times for 
new drugs reaching the market. Sarett [52, pp. 18-19] estimated that 
the total development and clearance time (exclusive of the discovery 
stage) has increased from 2.5 years in 1960 to 7.5 to 10 years in the 
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period 1968-1972. The lengthening product development time has 
shortened the effective life of a patent. Although the nominal patent 
life is 17 years, the effective patent life declined from 13.9 years 
for drugs introduced in 1966-1969 to 12.4 years for those introduced 
in 1970-1973 [56, p. 180]; the effective ·patent life of those NCE's 
approved in 1977 further declined to 9 years [65, p. 10]. 
Third, there appears to have been an increase in the risks of 
pharmaceutical innovation in the post-1962 period. Clymer [SJ estimated 
that prior to 1962, one out of every three new compounds that entered 
human testing became commercially available drugs. A higher attrition 
rate at the stages of IND and NDA submission was observed by Wardell [65] 
since the passage of the 1962 amendments: 
For every 10 that reach the stage of an IND filing in the 
U.S., five are dropped by the firm by 15 months into human 
testing. Nine out of the 10 have been dropped by the 
stage of NDA submission, but the one survivor that reaches 
an NDA submission has 90% chance of being approved by the 
FDA [p. 10]. 
Studies by Baily [2], Peltzman [48], and Grabowski, Vernon, and 
Thomas [24] all found that increased regulatory control in ethical drugs 
has been a major cause of the declining rate of innovation. As shown 
in Table III 'see p. 15) ·' in the decade before the amendments (1952-
1961) an average of 44 NCE's were introduced annually while in the 
subsequent decade it had fallen to 17. 
Consequently, higher costs and risks precipitated by the 1962 drug 
amendments seem to have made it difficult or impossible for small drug 
firms to conduct research. Innovational output has become more and 
more concentrated in fewer and larger drug firms [22, pp. 55-63]. In 
fact, the number of firms in the U.S. introducing new pharmaceutical 
products has dropped markedly from 89 in 1963 to 33 in 1972 [44]. 
E. Summary 
This chapter provides the background information necessary to 
understand the theoretical and empirical analysis of conditions of 
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entry into the pharmaceutical industry presented in Chapters III and IV. 
Demand for pharmaceutical products has grown rapidly since World War II. 
Several factors have contributed to this growth. These factors include 
the growth of population, the development of new drugs, the rise in 
income and the expansion of third party health care finance. On the 
supply side, the pharmaceutical industry is moderately concentrated, 
with a significant number of small~r firms. Meanwhile, concentration 
ratios for specific therapeutic categories are considerably high. The 
available evidence suggests that there seem to be no economies of size 
in the production of pharmaceutical drugs. Product differentiation 
through R & D and sales promotion is considered an important entry 
barrier. Another important entry barrier is created by the increased 
government regulation of drug quality as.a result of 1962 Drug A...~endments. 
CHAPTER III 
ENTRY CONDITION MODELS 
This chapter contains three sections. The first discusses the 
important role of entry conditions in explaining the relationship 
between market structure and performance. The next section develops a 
theoretical model for explaining the phenomenon of entry in a profit-
maximization framework. The last section of the chapter reviews 
selected previous literature pertaining to entry. 
A. The Importance of Entry Conditions 
The role of entry is of great importance in the process of adjustment 
of the productive capacity of an economic system to dynamic·change. In 
the perfectly competitive model entry is assumed to be free and easy; 
consequently, adjustments of productive capacity in response to profits 
and losses are thought to proceed smoothly and completely. Long-run 
' adjustments in the size of plant by individual firms, and the entrance 
or exit of firms to and from the industry tend to eliminate the profits 
or losses made in the industry. Prices of products are equal to their 
marginal and average costs in the long run. 
In the pure monopoly model, entry is assumed to be completely 
blocked, and adjustments to demand or cost changes--to the extent that 
I 
they occur--are very incomplete. Adjustments in the monopolized 
industry's productive capacity are limited to the changes in the size of 
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plant that the monopolist is able and willing to make, together with 
variations in the output rate of any given size of plant. Since the 
monopolist faces a less than perfectly elastic demand curve, the monopoly 
price exceeds marginal revenue and, consequently, price is greater than 
marginal cost. The monopolist's output is less than that at which 
marg;i.nal cost equals price. At the same time, blocked entry may keep 
price above average costs in the long run so that the profits persist. 
For both of these reasons monopolistic output tends to be below what 
the ~~mpetitive output would be. 
Jn oligopoly models the assumed entry conditions range all the way 
from completely open to completely blocked. However, much oligopoly 
analysis is based on an implisit assumption that entry is blocked; that 
i~, it ieaves the potential competition of entrants out of consideration, 
concentrating on the relationships among existing firms [3, p. 1). 
Actually, a wide range of adjustments to changes in demand or costs is 
possible in an oligopolistic industry depending on whether entry is 
partially or completely blocked. With partially blocked entry the time 
period over which price may exceed average costs will be longer than 
would be the case with completely open entry, but it is possible that 
profits could be eroded away over time. In other words, in the long run 
it may be possible for entry or exit of firms to occur. Whether or not 
the industry remains oligopolistic depends to a large extent on the 
condition of entry into that industry. 
In summary, entry conditions are an aspect of industrial structure 
which may be very useful in explaining market performance. Further, 
the conditions of entry tend to place a limit or ceiling on the degree 
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to which established firms can raise their prices above a competitive 
level without inducing entry [3, p. 3]. 
B. A Theoretical Model of Entry 
In building a theoretical model of entry, the premises underlying 
the theory should be stated explicitly. The fundamental premise used 
in this study is that firms attempt to maximize profits. The profit-
maximizing premise implies a firm will produce the output at which 
marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue. The same rules in profit 
maximization apply to the firms of particular oligopolistic industries 
in which nonprice competition through product differentiation (such as 
advertising and variation in product characteristics) is frequently 
1 used. That is, the firm seeking to maximize profits will carry out 
each activity to the point at which the marginal revenue from it equals 
its marginal cost [31, p. 319]. 
It is useful to start with a theory that is based on pure competi-
tion. This will help reveal what generates incentives for entry, how 
and why barriers to entry are erected, and what the impact of entry, if 
effected and to the degree it is effected, will be. 
In a purely competitive industry, entry is assumed to be easy and 
free. There are no barriers to entry. Assume that a purely competitive 
industry is initially in the long-run equilibrium situation as designated 
by point R1 in Figure 1. Now suppose that a disequilibriating force 
such as an increase in demand for the product occurs. Given the number 
1Profit maximization rules do not apply to the firms that practice 
limit pricing policies. 
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of firms operating in the industry, the price of that product will move 
upwards along the initial supply curve s1s1 to P1 1 and existing firms 
make profits. The existence of profits provides incentives for entry. 
Since there are no barriers, entry will take place until profits are 
aqueezed out. As shown in Figure 1, the expansion of capacity by 
existing firms, and the participation of new firms in the industry, 
shift the industry supply curve to s2s2 . The industry output increases 
from Q1 to Q2 , and all firms earn zero profit in the long run. 
When entry into an industry is partially or completely blocked, 
however, the rate of entry will not only be determined by the profit-
ability of existing firms, it will also be affected by the existence 
and height of entry barriers. Some entry barriers are of an absolute 
nature, for example, a government license may be needed to enter and 
the license may be unobtainable by potential entrants. Other barriers--
the ones that seem most important in this study--take the form of 
explicit or implicit entry costs imposed on potential entrants because 
of disadvantages which they have compared to firms already in the 
industry. Incentives to enter an industry vary directly with the amount 
of profits that are being made in it. On the other hand, entry incen-
tives vary inversely with the expected entry costs imposed by entry 
barriers. In making its entry decision, each potential entrant must 
consider the expected post-entry price level of its product and the 
expected cost conditions which it will have. The profits being earned 
by the existing firms may not induce the potential competitor to enter 
if the cost disadvantages imposed by entry barriers outweigh those 
profit incentives. In short, while profitability of existing firms will 
encourage new firms to enter, entry occurs only if a prospective entrant 
anticipates that post-entry profits will be realized. 
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Thus, the long-run adjustments in an industry characterized with 
entry barriers fall short of that illustrated in the purely competitive 
model. In terms of Figure 1, in response to an increase in demand the 
industry supply curve will shift to the right, to say s3s3 , but not as 







X per unit of time 
Figure 1. Supply Response to Shifting Demand 
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Obviously the disturbing force need not be an increase in product 
demand. It could as well be a decrease in costs for firms in the industry 
brought about by decreases in resource prices and/or improvements in 
technology. The entry rate response to the resulting increase in profits 
would be no different than in the theory discussed above. Neither would 
the entry rate response to entry barriers be different. 
Accordingly, the general form of a theoretical model can be expressed 
by the following two equations: 
E = f (rr*) 
where 
E is the actual rate of entry, 
W* is the expected profit rate of the entering firm, 
X. represents variables which provide incentives to entry, and 
.J. 
Yj represents variables which measure entry barriers. 
Therefore, 
y ) ClE 0, ~< o. E = h(X1 , x ' yl' ... ' and -- > ... • ' n m ax. ClY. 
]_ ]_ 
That is, entry is a function of the incentives to enter relative to 





The following additive regression equation is used in Chapter IV to 
investigate empirically the determinants of the rate of entry for a 
sample of 20 therapeutic markets in the pharmaceutical industry: 
E. =a+ b(DG.) + c(I.) + d(PD.) + e(CR.) + ui. 
J_ ]_ ]_ ]_ ]_ 
where 
E. is the rate of entry to market i, 
]_ 
DG. is the rate of demand growth in market i, 
]_ 
I. is the rate of innovation in market i, 
]_ 
(4) 
PD. is the measure of product differentiation entry barrier for 
l 
market i, 
CR. is the measure of concentration for market i, and 
l 
u. is a random error term. 
l 
The variables will be specified in Chapter IV. Ordinary least squares 
techniques will be employed to estimate equation (4). The empirical 
results will be presented in Chapter IV. 
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It should be recognized that not all variables affecting entry are 
included in the present study. As mentioned in Chapter II, for the 
pharmaceutical industry, the capital investment outlay for a potential 
entrant seems to be relatively low [49] and the economies of size in 
the production process do not appear to be of importance [58, 64). On 
the other hand, the economies of size in R & D and in sales promotion 
seem to be large enough to deter entry [11, 55, 56, 58). However, the 
difficulty of obtaining data which measure these economies for 20 
therapeutic drug markets has prevented this study from examining these 
variables. 2 
C. Selected Review of Previous Studies 
Although the conditions of entry have been recognized as one of 
the dimensions of market structure, direct measures of the rate of 
2The exclusion of the economies of size in R & D and in sales pro-
motion from the regression equation may lead to biasedness of the least 
squares estimators [63), especially the estimated regression coefficient 
of concentration. If these variables were included in the equation, a 
negative sign would be expected on their coefficients. Furthermore, 
the correlation between these omitted variables and the measure of 
concentration (for example, the four-firm concentration ratio or the 
Herfindahl Index) is expected to be positive. Thus, the estimated 
coefficient of concentration is expected to be biased downward. 
51 
entry were not used as dependent variables to study the relative 
importance of the various entry barriers until Mansfield introduced 
them in 1961 [33]. Alternative measures' of the rate of entry will be 
discussed first. Then a number of previous studies of the determinants 
of entry will be reviewed. 
1. Measures of Entry 
There is considerable disagreement among economists about how the 
rate of entry should be measured. McGuckin [32) and Duetsch [14) argue 
in separate st.udies that the "net rate of entry" is the proper measure 
to be used. They measure this net rate by the percentage change in the 
actual number of firms operating in a market over a given period. This 
measure ignores "firm turnover" (i.e., offsetting entries and exits of 
firms) during the time period and treats exits from an industry as 
negative entries; thus, the measure will have a negative value if the 
number of firms in the market declines over the time period. In addi-
tion, the measure does not take into account the sizes of individual 
entrants. As a result, it gives considerable weight to the changing 
number of very small firms. McGuckin and Duetsch each seem to think 
that this is an advantage of the measure because all entrants are 
potentially strong competitors in a market and, consequently, regardless 
of their sizes, they all may have important effects upon a market's 
performance. 
In another recent study, Telser [61) develops a somewhat different 
measure of "net entry". While his measure also ignores firm turnover, 
it does take the size of entrants into consideration. He measures the 
net rate of entry in a market by the proportion of the market's sales 
(in dollars) in a terminal year by companies who were absent from the 
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market in some specified base year. It measures successful "net" entry, 
not "gross" entry. It can be seen that this measure does not explicitly 
take into account the actual number of entrants within the time period 
studied. If the arguments of McGuckin and Duetsch are valid, Telser's 
measure suffers from the shortcoming that it dismisses the fact that 
small entrants may represent important sources of potential competition. 
An alternative measure of successful net entry is developed by 
Mansfield [33]. He measures the rate of entry in a market by the 
number of successful firms during the period (i.e., firms that entered 
and were still in operation) as a proportion of the original number of 
firms. The advantage of this measure over Telser's is that it takes 
into account the number of successful entrants in a market. 
Still another view about the proper way to measure entry in empirical 
studies is provided by Orr [43]. He contends that: "Gross entry is the 
appropriate measure of entry since we expect total entrants to be 
determined by the incentives and barriers to entry" [p. 59]. Orr 
measures the gross rate of entry by calculating the average annual 
number of new corporations in an industry during a given time period. 
He defines this measure in a way so that it must be either positive or 
equal to zero; it cannot be negative. 
The measure of entry used in this study follows closely that of 
Mansfield. It intends to measure the relative importance of successful 
entrants. It will be specified in Chapter V. 
2. Determinants of Entry 
Past studies of entry conditions have examined several determinants 
of entry. These are described below. The determinants used in this 
study will be specified in Chapter IV. 
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a. Expected Rate of Return. In testing the theoretical profit-
entry relationship, Orr [43, pp. 63-64] and Duetsch [14, p. 454] found 
that observed industry profitability measured by either the past profit 
rates or price-cost margins had a positive but weak impact on entry into 
manufacturing industries. A potential entrant bases its decision about 
whether to enter an industry not only on the past and current profit-
ability of the industry, but also on expected rate of return on its 
investment. The expected, not the observed rate of return on investment, 
is an important determinant of the actual entry rate. The higher the 
expected rate of return, other things being equal, the more strongly 
the potential entrants will be attracted into the industry. 
b. Demand Growth. Published studies by Gort [21] and Duetsch [14] 
have suggested that rapid growth in demand for products is likely to be 
a disequilibriating force that results in profits in the short run. 
Increases in the level of market demand for products, other things 
being equal, could raise profits of existing firms in the short run and 
thereby attract the entry of new firms to the industry in the long run. 
c. Technological Innovation. The impact of technological innova-
tion on the rate of entry depends to a large extent on whether control 
over technology is in the hands of established firms or potential 
entrants [42, p. 174; 71, p. 252]. It is necessary, therefore, to 
resort to empirical evidence in order to determine whether technological 
innovation deters entry or facilitates it. 
d. Economies of Large Size in Production. The presence of signifi-
cant size economies tends to provide an impediment to entry. If the 
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firms of an industry are characterized by declining long-run average 
cost curves and an appreciable fraction of industry output is accounted 
for by firms of minimum efficient size 3 , small-sized potential entrants 
would be forestalled due to the higher costs of production at outputs 
less than those of minimum efficient size. Further, the presence of 
significant size economies tends to build progressively higher barriers 
to entry as further entry occurs. The larger the fraction of industry 
output accounted for by a minimum efficient firm size, the more an 
entrant's output will depress industry price. Thus, the "supply effect" 
[43, p. 61] of economies of size tends to increase the ability of 
existing firms to raise the price without making entry profitable. Sylos 
[59] and Modigliani [38] considered this as a fundamental barrier to 
entry. Barriers to entry resting on large size economies may be 
measured by minimum efficient firm size divided by total market size. 
The higher the height of size economy barriers to entry, the fewer the 
new firms that are likely to enter the market. 
e. Capital Investment. The establishment of a new firm is an 
investment of new capital in the industry. Entry can be treated as a 
form of capital investment [46]. The investment required to establish 
a firm of minimum efficient size may be an entry barrier. Mansfield 
[33] estimated the effect of an industry's capital requirements on its 
entry rate. His study revealed a strong negative relationship between 
capital requirements and the rate of entry. In Orr's [43, p. 63] 
analysis of the determinants of entry, capital requirements also seemed 
to create a significant barrier to entry. 
3Minimum efficient size is defined as the smallest size at which all 
economies of size are realized. 
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f. Product Differentiation. Bain [3] found that product differ-
entiation was the most important barrier to entry in 20 manufacturing 
industries. Product differentiation barriers to entry result from the 
preferences of buyers for established products. Advertising is an 
important method of establishing brand loyalties. Thus strong product 
differentiation is usually expected to result from large advertising 
expenditures and this differentiation seems likely to discourage the 
entry of new firms. Even if new or improved products are invented, the 
entrants must allocate large sums to promote them. The costs of promo-
tion may const.itute one of the main elements in the cost of entry. 
Advertising intensity (advertising expenditures of established firms 
in an industry divided by the industry's total sales) has been used to 
measure the height of product-differentiation barriers to entry. An 
inverse relation between promotion intensity and the rate of entry was 
supported by the statistical studies of Orr [43, p. 63] and Duetsch 
[14, p. 455]. 
This widely held view that high promotional outlays create a 
barrier to entry has been reexamined by Telser [61]. His empirical 
results evidenced the contrary result of a positive relationship between 
advertising intensity and the rate of entry. In other words, promo-
tional outlays may represent a means of competition [pp. 473-477]. They 
constitute an avenue of entry, especially for large firms in developing 
new products. Well-established marketing channels as well as advantages 
of certain economies of size in promotion and physical distribution 
often permit large firms to gain market penetration more rapidly with 
new products. 
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g. Research and Development. Research and development projects 
are risky as well as expensive. Conceptual materialization, technical 
possibility and the extent of commercial utilization are uncertain when 
research projects are initiated. Some projects may be spectacularly 
costly and require a significant investment of resources. The view that 
research and development costs act as a barrier to entry has been 
carefully examined by Mueller and Tilton [39]. There may be some 
technical and financial economies of size in the performance of research 
and development. Several statistical analyses suggest that there may be 
increasing returns to R & D achievements when firms' sales levels range 
roughly from $75 million to $200 million (at the 1955 price level) in 
most industries. But beyond the "threshold" further increases in R & D 
activities are likely to have diminishing returns [34, 53]. 
h. Concentration. High short-run profits in an industry may 
eventually attract new firms which, in turn, would depress the post-entry 
profits of established firms. Established firms may refrain from setting 
high prices and deliberately produce outputs greater than those that 
maximize profits in the short run, lowering price sufficiently so that 
it is not profitable for potential entrants to enter [13, pp. 114-119, 
141-151; 54, pp. 219-234]. Therefore, firms with large market shares 
may engage in limit pricing to forestall entry and enjoy their profits 
over the long run. 
Alternative measures of concentration have been employed in 
different studies. These include the 4-firm concentration ratio, a 
"dynamic" measure of concentration originated by Grossack [25], the 
Herfindahl Index and a "numbers equivalent" derived from it. None of 
these measures of concentration, however, is completely satisfactory. 
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D. Summary 
This chapter developed a theoretical model of entry which assumes 
entry is a function of the incentives to entry relative to the level of 
entry barriers. This model will be used in the next chapter to 
evaluate the condition of entry into the pharmaceutical industry. 
CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first three 
sections describe data sources, the sample, and the variables used in 
the study. The fourth section contains the hypotheses to be tested. 
Finally, the empirical results of the study are presented. 
A. Data Sources 
The principal source of data for this study is the National 
Prescription Audit (NPA), which is compiled by IMS America, Ltd. The 
NPA is designed to measure the rate that prescription drugs move from 
retail pharmacies to consumers. IMS audits a sample of 800 retail 
1 
pharmacies stratefied by geographic location and store type. Individual 
pharmacies are also selected on the basis of prescription files repre-
senting a wide cross-section of different prescribers. The prescription 
information obtained from the sample is then projected to national 
2 levels. Prescription drugs dispensed in the institutional setting such 
as hospitals, nursing homes, or government agencies are not considered in 
the NPA. - Nevertheless, the NPA represents prescription drug consumption 
1The number of sampled retail pharmacies has increased from 400 to 
800 since 1973, according to IMS Pharmaceutical Services Reference File, 
1978. 
2starting in 1964, both new and refilled prescriptions have been 
collected. Prior to 1964, only new prescriptions were available. 
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and also reflects prescribing activity in the most important retail 
segment of the pharmaceutical industry. 
Data on drug product innovations were obtained from the Food and 
Drug Administration's report [16], "Yearly Introduction of New Drug 
Products,1950-1973". Each newly introduced drug was rated by personnel 
in the FDA's Bureau of Drugs on the basis of its "degree of therapeutic 
gain". New drugs were rated "A", "B", or no rating according to the 
following criteria. 
"A" Important Therapeutic Gain--Drug may provide effective 
therapy or diagnosis (by virtue of greatly increased 
efficacy or safety) for a disease not adequately treated 
or diagnosed by any marketed drug, or provide markedly 
improved treatment of a disease through improved efficacy 
or safety (including decreased abuse potential). 
"B" Modest Therapeutic Gain--Drug has a modest, but real 
advantage over other available marketed drugs; e.g., 
somewhat greater effectiveness, decreased adverse 
reactions, less frequent dosing in situations where 
frequent dosage is a problem, etc. [16, p. l]. 
Not all of the new drug products listed by the FDA are very 
original. That is, some of the new drug_products are new salts or 
esters of previously marketed drugs. Thus, the definition of drug 
innovations for this study includes all new products rated A or B less 
3 
any salts or esters of drugs already on the market. 
B. The Sample 
The importance of determining well-defined markets within the 
pharmaceutical industry has been stressed in several previous studies 
[26, 29, 61]. This stems from the fact that drug manufacturers do not 
3Detailed information on drug innovation for the time period 
1963-1973 is presented in Jadlow [29, pp. 49-67]. 
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compete on an industry-wide basis [11, p. 377]. In addition, inappro-
priate market definitions tend to distort the results of empirical 
studies [29, p. 37]. 
Theoretically, an economically meaningful market should be defined 
to include all those products which are close substitutes in both 
consumption and production [41, pp. 17-22]. However, in defining 
empirical drug markets, much emphasis is usually given to substitutability 
in consumption [10, pp. 349-351; 26, pp. 19-22; 60, pp. 211-212]. 
The pharmaceutical industry is grouped into 20 therapeutic drug 
markets as a basis for the empirical analysis of the present study. 
These 20 drug markets used in this study are the same as those developed 
by Jadlow [29] and are presented in Table XIV. 
In defining these markets, Jadlow [29] relied heavily upon substi-
tutability in drug usage. The data from National Disease and Therapeutic 
Index (NDTI) 4 on physicians' prescribing patterns for individual drug 
products were employed to group National Prescription Audit therapeutic 
classes into 20 relevant markets. This was accomplished by first 
identifying the therapeutic classes of drugs prescribed to treat similar 
broad diagnoses and then, from these groupings, sorting out the classes 
which had similar desired therapeutic actions. Finally, drug classes 
prescribed for more specific diagnoses were grouped together [29, 
pp. 40-48]. 
4NDTI is compiled by IMS America, Ltd. 
TABLE XIV 
THERAPEUTIC CLASSES GROUPED. AS TWENTY ECONOMIC 
MARKETS (MARKET/THERAPEUTIC CLASSES) 
-1. Antibiotics 
a. Broad and medium spectrum antibiotics 
b. Penicillins 
c. Other antibiotics 
2. Sulfonamides and Antibacterials 
a. Urinary antibacterials 
b. Antibiotics with sulfas 
c. Sulfonamides 
·3. General antibacterials 
4. Analgesics 
a. Narcotic analgesics 
b. Nonnarcotic analgesics 





c. Corticoids with analgesics 
d. Corticoids with antiinfectives 




a. Barbiturate sedatives 
b. Nonbarbiturate sedatives 
12. Cough and Cold Preparations 
13. Antihypertensives and Diuretics 
a. Rauwolfias 
b. Rammlfias-Diuretic combinations 




TABLE XIV (Continued) 
15. Vitamins 
16. Oral Contraceptives 
17. Anticholinergics and Antispasmodics 
18. Antiobesity Preparations 
a. Amphetamines 
b. Nonamphetamines 




Source: Joseph M. Jadlow, An Empirical Study of 
the Relationship Between Market 
Structure and Innovation in Therapeutic 
Drug Markets, 1976. 
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C. The Variables 
The dependent and indiependent variables which are employed for the 
empirical analysis of the present study are discussed below. The values 
of these variables for each of the 20 drug markets are presented in 
Table X.V. A correlation matrix of the independent variables is listed 
in Table X.VI. As can be seen, no serious linear dependence exists 
between the explanatory variables. 
1. The Rate of Entry (E) 
In this study, the rate of entry is measured by computing the number 
of new firms operating in a market as a percentage of the total number 
of firms in that market. Specifically, for each of 20 markets, 
E 
The number of firms in 1974 that had not been 
in the market in 1964 
The average of the total number of existing 
firms in 1964 and 1974 
2. The Rate of Demand Growth (DG) 
The rate of demand growth for each market is measured by the rate 
of growth in the number of prescriptions in that market between 1964 and 
1974. DG can be expressed as follows: 
DG 
Change in number of prescriptions between 
1964 and 1974 
Total number of prescriptions in 1964 
3. The Rate of Innovation (I) 
The rate of innovation is defined as the ratio of the value of new 
products relative to the size of the market. In this study, the value 
of each new product is measured by the product's dollar sales in its 
TABLE XV 
VALUES OF VARIABLES USED FOR THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Market* E DG I PD CR4 HI NE DYN 
1 82.667% 99.938% 26.995% 26.67% 57.689% 11. 457% 9 0.223 
2 39.456 -1. 713 23.504 40.48 65.611 23.338 4 0.849 
3 46.512 63.388 4.031 37.19 52.555 11. 892 8 0.820 
4 60. 987 117.936 1. 398 21.54 65. 877 18.254 5 0.786 
5 57.143 30. 981 0.000 6.38 57.654 11.184 9 0.826 
6 40.000 242.652 232. 710 45.03 86.822 35.902 3 0.732 
7 45.752 65 .102 0.000 27.59 47.705 8.231 12 0.592 
8 45. 2 83 51.115 0.000 32. 80 69.585 14.993 7 0.667 
9 71.642 125. 611 0.437 14.69 86.735 24 .113 4 1.069 
10 22. 72 7 54.635 0.000 100.00 77. 452 16.256 6 1.196 
11 46. 2 69 -8.645 8.195 27.27 60.906 10. 800 9 0.513 
12 71.161 100.259 o.ooo 33.63 42.794 7.462 13 0. 727 
13 49.524 107 .100 7.822 41.38 71. 292 19.535 5 0.858 
14 54. 971 13.769 o.ooo 31.40 44~888 8.500 12 0.471 
15 55.870 31. 491 0.000 42.78 38. 4 71 6.110 16 0.618 
16 54.545 269.243 0.000 100.00 97.883 49.001 ') 0.288 '-
17 53.691 40.849 0.000 51. 90 60.105 13.056 8 0.995 
18 41. 66 7 -40.537 10. 845 39.69 69.313 19.920 5 0.279 
19 16.667 147.866 29.007 56.60 97.737 54.335 2 0.229 
20 64. 789 28.644 0.000 0.00** 71. 792 17. 071 6 1.173 
* The numbers in this column refer to the listing of revelant markets presented in Table XIV. 
*ic 
Based on the National Prescription Audi~, the calculated value of PD was equal to -22.64%. A 
negative PD may be due to rounding errors since numbers less than 1,000 were not registered in the NPA. 
Since a negative PD does not make sense on theoretical grounds, it was replaced with zero. 
°' +:-
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5 second calendar year on the market , and the size of a market is 
measured by its total number of prescriptions in 1964. Therefore, for 









The dollar sales of new products during their 
second calendar year on the market 
The total number of prescriptions in 1964 
TABLE XVI 
CORRELATION MATRIX 
DG I PD CR4 HI 
1.00 
0.49 1.00 
0.39 0.06 1.00 
0.60 0.33 0.41 1.00 
0.69 0.37 0.47 0.89 1.00 
-0.46 -0.32 -0.29 -0. 92 -0.81 
-0.16 -0.06 -0.15 -0.03 -0.30 




Product differentiation cannot be achieved without costs. As 
DYN 
1.00 
discussed in the previous chapter, large drug firms tend to spend large 
sums on new product introduction and sales promotion in an attempt to 
5The second year is used instead of the first year because the sales 
data available are for calendar years and because the sales in the first 
year are likely to provide distorted weights. By doing so, an indication 
of the economic importance of each new drug is obtained [29). 
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establish effective product differentiation. Thus, investment in R & D 
and sales promotion may be regarded as the costs of product differentia-
tion. They are often beyond the reach of small firms and may constitute 
an important barrier to entry to a drug market. Moreover, expenditures 
on sales promotion often have a "cumulative effect, so that newcomers 
starting from scratch face a dilemma: They either have to spend large 
amounts on promotion per unit of output to overcome their disadvantage, 
or they must accept a lower unit price for products of comparable 
quality" [54, p. 230]. 
Since expenditures on R & D and sales promotion for individual drug 
markets are not available for this study, a proxy for product differentia-
tion has been developed. The wholesale prices of generic drug products 
in a given therapeutic class have frequently been far below those of the 
brand-name products [56, p. 315]. The disparities in price may reflect 
the higher level of product differentiation efforts in behalf of 
established drug products. Hence, the relative wholesale price 
. . 6 d . . . 7 differentials between brand-name prescriptions an generic prescriptions 
should provide a crude measure of product differentiation (PD). For each 





p - p 
b g 
Pb 
the average wholesale price of brand-name prescriptions in 
1964, and 
the average wholesale price of generic prescriptions in 1964. 
6 Brand-name prescriptions are those prescriptions which specify_ 
brand names or designate manufacturers of the prescribed drugs. 
7Generic prescriptions are those prescriptions which are prescribed 
by generic names only. 
5. Measure of Concentration (CR) 
Four alternative measures of concentration are employed in this 
study. These are (1) the 4-firm concentration ratio (CR4), (2) the 
Herfindahl Index (HI), (3) the numbers-equivalent (NE), and (4) the 
"dynamic" measure of concentration (DYN). 
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a. Four-Firm Concentration Ratio. The 4-firm concentration ratio 
(CR4) is the well-known static measure of market power and is measured 
in this· study as the percentage of a market's total prescriptions 
contributed by the largest 4 firms in that market. 
b. Herfindahl Index. The Herfindahl Index (HI) is a summary 
measure of concentration which takes into accotrrlt absolute sizes of 
sellers and the dispersion of seller sizes; it is measured by the sum 
of the squared percentage market shares of all sellers in a market. 
In the present study, a technique suggested by Adelman [l, p. 101] is 
used to calculate the HI. For each market, the HI is estimated on the 
basis of the respective market shares of the 8 largest firms in that 
market and the shares of the smaller firms, where the latter are assumed 
to share equally the remainder of the market. 
c. Numbers-Equivalent. The numbers-equivalent (NE) is equal to 
the reciprocal of the Herfindahl Index [l]. The NE can be interpreted 
as "the number of equal-sized firms" in a market which would generate 
the observed value of the Herfindahl Index [l, p. 100]. 
d. Dynamic Measure of Concentration. The "dynamic" measure of 
concentration (DYN) is the regression coefficient that is estimated by 
regressing individual firms' market shares in 1974 on their 1964 market 
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shares (25]. The DYN measures market share stability over the time 
period studied. The larger firms in 1964, on the average, gained market 
shares when the value of DYN is greater than one and lose market shares 
when the value of DYN is less than one [25, p. 303]. In the present 
study, DYN is estimated by using the respective market shares of the 
7 largest firms either in 1964 or in 1974 and the shares of the smaller 
firms, which were assumed to share equally the remainder of the market. 
It should be noted that these regression results for DYN are the same as 
those which appeared in the study by Jadlow [29]. 
D. Hypotheses About the Signs of 
the Regression Coefficients 
As discussed in Chapter III, the entry rate is expected to respond 
positively to variables which may increase the rate of profits and 
negatively to the extent and height of entry barriers. In order to 
assess the relationship between the rate of entry and the condition of 
entry into drug markets, the following equation will be estimated: 
E. = a+ b(DG.) + c(I.) + d(PD.) + e(CR.) + u. 
]. ]. ]. ]. ]. ]. 
The rapid growth in demand for products is likely to be a disequi-
librating force that results in supranormal profits of existing firms 
in the short run [21, pp. 54-55] and thereby attracts the entry of new 
firms in the long run. Therefore, a positive sign is expected on the 
coefficient of DG. 
Technological innovation may foreclose or facilitate entry, 
depending largely on whether established firms or potential entrants 
control the technology necessary for producing products [42, p. 174; 
71, p. 252]. Therefore, the sign for the coefficient of I could be 
positive or negative. 
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Product differentiation cannot be accomplished without costs. Costs 
of product differentiation such as expenditures on R & D and/or sales 
promotion may be sufficiently large so that it is not profitable for 
potential firms to enter [3, 39]. Thus, a negative sign is expected on 
the coefficient of PD. 
Firms with high monopoly power may practice limit pricing to dis-
courage entry [13, pp. 114-119, 141-151; 54, pp. 219-234]. Thus, a 
negative sign is expected on the coefficient of concentration measured 
alternatively by CR4, HI, and DYN. Since the numbers-equivalent is the 
reciprocal of the Herfindahl Index [l], a positive sign is expected on 
the coefficient of NE. 
E. The Empirical Results 
Table XVII summarizes the empirical results of the multiple 
regression equations based upon the model specified in Chapter III. 
The regression results with E (the number of new firms operating in a 
market as a percentage of the total number of firms in that market) as 
the dependent variable are presented in Table XVII. To estimate each 
of the equations, the same independent variables are employed with the 
exception of the measure of concentration. Concentration is measured 
by the 4-firm concentration ratio in equation l; the Herfindahl Index 
in equation 2; the numbers-equivalent in equation 3; and the dynamic 
measure of concentration in equation 4. 
For each equation, the estimated regression coefficients of the 
variables are listed in the table along with the coefficient of multiple 
2 
determination (R ) and the value of the F-ratio. In the parentheses 
below each coefficient is the valur of the t-statistic for that 
TABLE XVII 
DETERMINANTS OF THE RATE OF ENTRY, E AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, 1964-1974 
Inter- Concentration 
R2 Equation cept DG I PD CR4 HI NE DYN 
1 83.072* 0.145* -0.115**** -0.379* -0.400*** .588 
(7. 37) (3.10) (-1.96) (-3.22) (-2. 04) 
2 67.149* 0.171i' -0.109*,"** -0.339* -0.746** .662 
(14.28) (3. 83) (-2.05) (-3.12) (-2.89) 
3 48.782* 0.129** -0 .110***,~ -0.405* 1. 411**** .563 
(5. 31) (2.79) (-1.81) (-3.41) (1. 75) 
4 62. 492," 0.103*** -0.125**** -0.438* -0.223 .473 
(6.56) (2.16) (-1.90) (-3. 39) (-0. 02) 
Note: The t-statistics are in parentheses below their corresponding regression coefficients. 
* Significant at the .01 level. 
*t' Significant at the .02 level. 
,"** Significant at the .05 level. 










coefficient. Significance tests have been performed on individual 
regression coefficients. One asterisk indicates the coefficient is 
significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level; two, the 0.02 
level; three, the 0.05 level; and four, the 0.10 level. F-tests are 
made to determine the overall significance of estimated equations. One, 
two, or three asterisks attached to the value of the F-ratio indicate 
alternative levels of significance as described earlier. 
When the dependent variable (i.e., the rate of entry) was measured 
by E, the overall regression was significant at the 0.01 level for 
equations 1 through 3 and at the 0.05 level for equation 4. The coeffi-
cient of multiple determination (R2) measures the proportion of variation 
in the rate of entry explained by the set of independent variables. 
2 
Hence, the closer R is to 1, the higher the explanatory power of 
independent variables. As can be seen in Table XVII, regression 
equation 1 explains nearly 59 percent of the variation in E among the 
20 relevant markets; equation 2, 66 percent; equation 3, 56 percent; and 
equation 4, 47 percent. 
While R2 measures the degree to which the variation of the dependent 
variable is accounted for by the explanatory variables, it does not 
show the importance of the individual explanatory variable in explaining 
the dependent variable. Neither does the magnitude of the regression 
cqefficient measure the importance of each explanatory variable. In 
fact, the magnitude of the coefficient can be changed by changing the 
units of measurement of the variable [20, p. 197]. 
As suggested by Goldberger [20, pp. 167-187] and Theil [63, pp. 197-
200], the "marginal' or "incremental" contributions of individual 
variables to the explanation of the rate of entry (E) are calculated 
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and presented in Table XIX. With the exception of equation 2, product 
differentiation was the most important explanatory variable, followed 
by the demand growth variable. The third most important explanatory 
variable was the measure of concentration (CR4, HI, or NE) for equations 
1, 2, and 3, and it was drug innovation for equation 4. The least 
important explanatory variable was drug innovation for all but equation 4. 
TABLE XVIII 
INCREMENTAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Incremental 
Contribution 
as a Percentage 
of Total 
Incremental Contribution 
Equation Variable Contribution (%) 
1 DG .265 34.4 
I .105 13.7 
PD .286 37.1 
CR4 .114 14.8 
2 DG .331 39.7 
I • 095 11.4 
PD .220 26.3 
HI .189 22.6 
3 DG .227 30.2 
I .095 12.7 
PD .340 45.2 
NE .090 11.9 
4 DG .164 23.6 
I .126 . 18.2 
PD .404 58.2 
DYN .000 0.0 
a. The Effect of Market Growth. In each of the four equations, 
the regression coefficient for the demand growth rate was positive and 
significantly different from zero. This result is similar to what 
earlier studies have found [14, 32] and confirms the theoretical 
importance of demand growth in determining the rate of entry. It 
suggests that among markets with the same entry barriers, rapidly 
growing markets are more likely to encourage entry than are less 
rapidly growing ones. 
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b. The Effect of Drug Innovation. In each of the four equations, 
the regression coefficients for the rate of innovation was negative and 
significantly different from zero at the .10 level. This inverse 
relationship implies that new drug innovation serves as a deterrent to 
entry [71]. This result seems consistent with the thesis that in 
markets with rapid rates of innovation, there is less chance for 
smaller firms to enter the market. 
The result is not surprising. As pointed out in Chapter II, all 
new drug compounds must pass an extensive premarket regulatory review 
process since the passage of the 1962 Drug Amendments. As a result, the 
drug research and development has become more expensive and riskier. 
Consequently, the development and introduction of new chemical entities 
in the United States has increasingly become the domain of fewer and 
larger drug firms. New chemical entities available in the United States 
during the period of 1963-1973 were, in fact, introduced by the largest 
25 drug firms [29, pp. 47-69]. In other words, nearly all new drugs 
were introduced into a market by firms already in the market, rather 
than by new firms. 
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Moreover, new drugs and patent protection usually go hand in hand. 
Patent rights make it more difficult for other firms to imitate new 
products. Because of patent barriers, firms seem more likely to enter 
into a market where a substantial proportion of drugs being sold are 
"old" drugs. 
Therefore, it may not be surprising that in markets where there is 
a high rate of innovation, the net rate of entry has been relatively 
low while the entry rate has been high in markets where there has been a 
low rate of innovation. In the case of the pharmaceutical industry, the 
rate of innovation may be considered as an approximation to entry 
barriers associated with R & D and/or patent protection. 
c. The Effect of Price Differentials. In each of the four 
equations, the regression coefficient for the price differentials was 
negative and significantly different from zero at the .01 level. This 
result supports the proposition that product differentiation consti-
tutes a barrier to the entry of new firms. 
In the pharmaceutical industry, it is a well-known practice that 
drug manufacturers who market branded drugs spend large sums to promote 
their products to the medical profession and hence establish strong 
brand loyalties. This places new entrants in a disadvantageous position 
because they must spend heavily on product promotion and/or set their 
prices perceptibly lower than those of established products in order to 
overcome brand loyalties. In fact, little promotional effort is made by 
many smaller firms that enter into the production and sale of drugs on 
which the patents have expired. These firms primarily market drugs 
under generic names and place their products at a price substantially 
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below existing drug firms. Therefore, significant differences in 
promotion strategies may in large part explain the wide differences in 
prices of branded and unbranded products. 
In short, entry appears to be more difficult and hence less 
frequent in markets characterized by substantial product differentiation 
entry barriers created through product promotion. 8 The result of the 
present study supports the view that high promotional outlays may serve 
as an impediment to entry. 
d. The Effects of Concentration. Four alternative measures of 
concentration were employed to estimate their effects on the rate of 
entry. When the level of concentration was measured by the market shares 
held by the largest four firms in 1964, the rate of entry and the 4-firm 
concentration ratio were found to be inversely related. The regression 
coefficient of CR4 was significantly different from zero at the .05 
level. 
When the Herfindahl Index was substituted for the CR4, the inverse 
relation remained and the coefficient for HI was significantly different 
from zero at the .02 level. It has been argued that on theoretical 
grounds the Herfindahl Index is the best measure of market power [66]. 
The suitability of HI over other measures of concentration is supported 
2 
here by the fact that the R turned out to be the highest when concen-
tration was measured by HI. 
When concentration was measured by the numbers-equivalent, the 
regression coefficient was positive and significantly different from 
zero at the .10 level. Since the NE is equal to the reciprocal of the 
8 Product differentiation through R & D has been taken into account by 
including the rate of innovation in the regression as discussed earlier. 
estimated value of HI, a negative relation between the HI and the net 
entry rate would imply a positive relation between the NE and entry. 
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When the dynamic measure of concentration was substituted for the 
static measure of concentration, the regression coefficient was negative. 
However, the statistical testing shows that coefficient is not signifi-
cantly different from zero. 
The statistical evidence reveals that entry into a highly concen-
trated market is more difficult than entry into a less concentrated 
market. This result would be consistent with the use of limit pricing 
to deter entry in highly concentrated markets. Alternatively, the 
inverse relationship between the entry and the level of concentration 
described here could be explained by the presence of barriers to entry 
in a concentrated market. Thus, concentration may serve as a proxy for 
other unmeasured entry barriers. The finding that concentration is 
inversely related to entry is consistent with that of Orr [43] and 
Hornbrook [27]. 
F. Sunnnary 
In this chapter, an empirical model developed in the previous 
chapter is estimated along with a discussion of data and hypotheses. 
The major empirical findings of the study may be summarized as follows: 
1. Product differentiation, concentration, and drug innovation 
were fotmd to be inversely related to the rate of entry into 
drug markets, and 
2. the growth rate of demand for pharmaceuticals was found to be 
positively related to the rate of entry. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter summarizes the methodology and empirical results of 
the study. Also, based on the findings of this study, suggestions are 
made for further research. 
A. Summary 
Entry is of great importance in explaining relationships between 
industrial structure and performance. Despite its theoretical prominence, 
however, until recently there has been little empirical research on the 
factors that determine the rate of entry into any specific industry. 
The present study has focused specifically on entry in the pharma-
ceutical industry. The main objective of the study has been to develop 
and test a model which describes the various determinants of entry into 
the pharmaceutical industry during the period 1964-1974. 
In this study, the rate of enter (E) as the dependent variable was 
measured by the number of new firms operating in a market as a percentage 
of the total number of firms in that market. The variables used in this 
study to explain the variations in the rate of entry were market growth, 
drug innovation, product differentiation, and concentration. Market 
growth was measured by the percentage change in the size of the market 
over the time period studied. The value of new drug products relative 
to the size of the market was used as the measure of the rate of drug 
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innovation. Product differentiation was measured by the relative price 
disparities between branded and generic drugs. Concentration was 
measured alternatively by the 4-firm concentration ratio, the Herfindahl 
Index, the numbers-equivalent, and the dynamic measure of concentration. 
The difficulty of obtaining other data by therapeutic market has 
confined this study to the above variables. 
All four of the alternative equations which were estimated were 
statistically significant. The statistical evidence revealed: (1) a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between the rate of 
entry and the rate of growth in demand; (2) a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between the rate of entry and product differ-
entiation; (3) a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between the rate of entry and the rate of drug innovation; and (4) an 
inverse relationship between the rate of entry and the measure of concen-
tration, regardless of which of the four measures of concentration was 
used; however, no statistical relationship was observed between the rate 
of entry and the dynamic measure of concentration. 
Furthermore, this study has indicated that product differentiation 
is the most important factor in explaining the variations in the rates 
of entry. Demand growth was found to be the second most important 
factors, followed by concentration and drug innovation. 
In sum, the statistical findings of the study were consistent with 
a prior expectations and the few previous studies which have been 
published [3, 14, 32, 43]. It is interesting to note that product 
differentiation tends to present a barrier to entry into drug markets, 
while Telser [60] has concluded that promotional outlays tend to serve 
as a means of entry. It should be noted, however, that price disparities 
between branded and generic drugs were used as a proxy for product 
differentiation in this study. A more conventional measure of product 
differentiation (i.e., promotional intensity) was employed in Telser' s 
study [60]. 
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One of the unique features of the present study was to examine the 
role of technological innovation in the process of entry into therapeutic 
drug markets. In this regard, the focus of the study was on new drug 
innovation. The statistical evidence indicated that R & D resulting in 
new drug introductions serves as a barrier, not a means of entry as 
hypothesized by Comanor [11]. 
Still another feature of the study was to employ four alternative 
measures of concentration as explanatory variables for the rate of entry. 
Out of all the estimated equations, the equation employing the Herfindahl 
Index did the best job of explaining the rate of entry. This is not 
surprising because it is generaliy considered to be the best measure of 
market power on theoretical grounds [66]. 
B. Future Research 
Lack of data precluded the analysis in this study of the impacts on 
entry of various other possible determinants of the rate of entry. It 
would be useful, for example, to incorporate such variables as economies 
of size. in R & D ·and in sales promotion into the model in future studies. 
As discussed in Chapter II, previous studies have suggested that 
the 1962 Drug Amendments heightened entry barriers to conduting R & D 
in the pharmaceutical industry. This subject seems important enough to 
warrant further study. It would be useful to estimate the model developed 
here for a period before 1962 and compare the results with those found 
for the post-Amendments period to see if increased regulation has 
altered the determinants of the rate of entry. 
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Probably the most obvious extension of this study would be to 
obtain data for other industries and estimate entry models similar to 
those employed here. This could be useful, for example, in the formula-
tion of public policy toward these industries in the antitrust area. 
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